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From Dr. Bonham to Ms. Horowitz:
Fair Hearing in Historical
Perspective
NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON*
When I saw the general title of this program-Close Encounters
with the Twenty-First Century-my first inclination was to an-
nounce that, like my astronomy colleague at Northwestern, Pro-
fessor Hynek, I was much more interested in UFO's than in
institutional due process and so I proposed to talk about them in-
stead. After fighting down that inspiration and concentrating
more directly on the subject prescribed, it occurred to me that the
occasional flowerings of procedural due process are really legal
manifestations of the deep concerns that are troubling and divid-
ing our society at any particular time. In the 1930s, for example,
the great drama was the struggle for effectuation of the New Deal.
At first the battle was fought on the constitutional law front and
the issue of federal power was dominant; but when the forces of
free enterprise or reaction-whichever you prefer to call
them-were defeated there, their spokesmen quickly shifted to
the administrative law battle line. Chief Justice Hughes him-
self-speaking in an informal address somewhat above the bat-
tle--described the watchword of the omnivorous bureaucrat
epigrammatically as: "I care not who makes my country's laws, so
long as I can find the facts." In those days, the anathema of the
regulatee was the institutional decision; its great defender, our
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own Professor Davis. The heartstrings of administrative law were
the four Morgan cases,1 now hardly mentioned in contemporary
casebooks. The great issues of that time were eventually compro-
mised and all but forgotten in the ambiguous phrases of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.
The next great flowering of administrative due process was in
the 1950s during the McCarthy era-the halcyon days of the
House Un-American Activities Committee's search for subver-
sives, the loyalty or security programs, the Attorney General's list
of subversive organizations, and the entertainment industry's
blacklists. For lawyers engaged in the fight against these all-per-
vasive phenomena, the principal target was the anonymous in-
former. the FBI's secret agent whose identity could not be
disclosed even to members of the loyalty boards lest our security
network be dismembered. Against this elusive enemy, our knight
errants' principal weapon-almost as potent as King Arthur's Ex-
calibur-was the sacred right of cross-examination. In those days
we won some and we lost some. There were notable victories,
like Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee case 2 and Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court in Greene v. McElroy.3 There were also some setbacks, like
Justice Stewart's majority opinion in the Cafeteria Workers case.
4
Gradually, however, the miasma of suspected subversion sub-
sided, and the undisclosed informant ceased to create such a
burning issue.
Now we are engaged in another great civil war on the field of
administrative due process. Here too I am inclined to search for
the underlying causes of the battle; but they are not so easy to
identify, perhaps because we are ourselves so deeply immersed in
them. Vaguely I feel it is all part of the perhaps hopeless struggle
of the individual against the system, each one of us-like the
hapless fly in the spider's web-engaged in battle with his own
particular system, be it the welfare system, the school system, the
prison system, the mental health system, or even the medicare
system. With respect to this last system, at least, I can speak with
indignation born of personal experience. But whenever I tell my
tale of exasperation to a friend or even to a passing acquaintance,
I am apt to get a similar tale in response, but worse. The burden
1. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941); United States v. Morgan, 307
U.S. 183 (1939); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); Morgan v. United States,
298 U.S. 468 (1936).
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
3. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
4. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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of the song is always the same: how to break through the endless,
repetitive clatter of the computer and get a sensible human re-
sponse instead. If I could but live to see the birth of the twenty-
first century, what I would fear most would not be inflation, the
energy shortage, or even nuclear war, but the complete and irre-
versible triumph of the computer. Perhaps the computer is only
the mechanical personification of what others have called the sys-
tem of mass justice 5 Perhaps too this is partly what Judge
Friendly had in mind, in his great essay entitled Some Kind of
Hearing,6 when he suggested that one crucial element in assuring
a fair hearing that might compensate for the lack of many other
safeguards might be the right of appeal to some private and im-
partial individual entirely outside the system responsible for ad-
ministering the program. Query whether we could recruit enough
such private and qualified individuals and whether we could pre-
vail upon the systems to entrust such individuals with that much
responsibility.
Another query is whether the distinction between procedural
due process and substantive due process is not breaking down in
the course of the expansion and application of the due process
hearing to almost every type of governmental activity significantly
affecting private interests. The most recent example I have in
mind is the Supreme Court's decision just a few weeks ago in
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz,7 in
which a senior medical student was not permitted to graduate
and was eventually dismissed from the school. This was a diffi-
cult case because the student's purely academic record in the
school was excellent, but her clinical performance was regarded
as abysmal. She was warned about her shortcomings some time
before the final decision, and after the first tentative decision de-
nying graduation she was given special oral examinations by
seven practicing physicians. Two of these physicians recom-
mended that she be allowed to graduate, two that she be dropped
from school, and three that she be denied graduation with her
5. See D. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
(1974); R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY, DIsABILrrY AND MASS JUSTICE: A PROBLEM IN
WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (1973); Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process:
Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness,
and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
772 (1974).
6. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
7. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
class but be permitted to continue in school. After receiving
these reports the duly constituted authorities of the school de-
cided to deny both graduation and permission to continue in
school. The student's complaint attacked the decision on both
procedural and substantive due process groinds. The district
court, after trial, dismissed the complaint, apparently on both
grounds. The court of appeals reversed on the procedural due
process issue without reaching the substantive due process issue.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals and reinstated the judgment of the district court. Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun agreed with the majority's pro-
cedural due process decision but partially dissented on the
ground that the case should have been remanded to the court of
appeals for consideration of the substantive due process claim.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, assumed without de-
ciding that the plaintiff's dismissal deprived her of liberty or prop-
erty sufficiently to trigger the requirements of procedural due
process; he concluded, however, that those requirements had
been satisfied by the academic procedures used. Furthermore,
the decision was based not on disciplinary considerations, as in
Goss v. Lopez,8 but rather on academic performance and qualifi-
cations, albeit in a clinical context. In this connection it was im-
material that part of the dissatisfaction was based on lack of
punctuality and lack of personal cleanliness. "[P] ersonal hygiene
and timeliness," said Justice Rehnquist, "may be as important
factors in a school's determination of whether a student will make
a good medical doctor as the student's ability to take a case his-
tory or diagnose an illness."9 Any additional hearing require-
ments would "risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the
faculty-student relationship" because as the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court said "over 60 years ago . . . a hearing
may be 'useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to scholar-
ship.' "10
In dismissing the substantive due process claim Justice Rehn-
quist was even more cryptic, saying: "Courts are particularly ill-
equipped to evaluate academic performance. The factors dis-
cussed ... with respect to procedural due process speak a
fortiori here and warn against any such judicial intrusion into ac-
ademic decisionmaking."n The conclusion seems to be that if the
school procedures are reasonably designed to achieve a correct
8. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
9. 435 U.S. at 91 n.6.
10. Id. at 90 (quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 23, 102
N.E. 1095, 1097 (1913)).
11. Id. at 92.
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academic decision, and if these procedures are faithfully ob-
served, neither substantive nor procedural due process requires
more.
Doubtless most of us faculty members would prefer that con-
clusion to be the rule so far as our own academic decisions are
concerned. Maybe Horowitz was the proverbial hard case that de-
cided any other way would have made bad law. Nevertheless, I
cannot quite escape the uneasy feeling that there might have
been a better solution. Maybe Ms. Horowitz gave no promise of
becoming properly qualified to practice medicine, but that career
was the farthest thing from her desires. She wanted to do medi-
cal research for which she apparently was superbly qualified and
in which she had already been promised a position. Yet the req-
uisite qualifications for the job included a medical degree. Some-
where the system seems to have gone askew. Either the job's
qualifications should be changed, or she should get a degree that
would qualify her for medical research but not for medical prac-
tice. I keep wondering whether that solution will be the eventual
resolution of Ms. Horowitz's problem.
I cannot leave the Horowitz case without recalling that Dr. Bon-
ham's Case,'2 the seventeenth century fountainhead of procedur-
al due process, involved a plaintiff who had received his degree as
Doctor of Physic from the University of Cambridge. The Presi-
dent and Censors of the London Faculty of Physic imprisoned
him for having practiced in London without their license and for
having refused to pay their fine. Apparently, Bonham too was re-
volting against the system of his time.
I have a final query, suggested by the moderator as the princi-
pal subject of my contribution. What if anything do these cases of
informal individual adjudication-stretching from Goldberg13 to
Horowitz-have to do with contemporary cases of economic regu-
lation under modern statutes allowing "informal" or "notice and
comment," or "hybrid" rulemaking? The most interesting exam-
ples of such cases are those from the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, like the International Harvester case 14 in-
volving standards for automobile emissions, the Ethyl Corp.
case' 5 involving standards for lead content of ethyl gasoline, and
12. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (1610).
13. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
14. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
15. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
most recently the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power case, 16 pending
before the Supreme Court and involving the disposition of nu-
clear wastes. Obviously these environmental problems are tre-
mendously important and concern issues of infinite scientific and
technical complexity. For the most part the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has handled these cases with great intel-
lectual competence. Nevertheless, that court has been deeply di-
vided, sometimes in results but more often in articulating how it
has reached its results. Some members of the court tend to think
that they must formulate their results entirely in procedural
terms, shrinking from any judgment on the merits as obviously
beyond their abilities. Others are more inclined to grasp the net-
tle of substantive rationality, insisting that this is the responsibil-
ity that Congress has placed upon them and that even scientific
and technical issues of the greatest complexity can be subjected
to this basic standard of judicial review.17 Some people think that
the ultimate solution must be either to get the courts out of this
business entirely or to create a special supreme court composed
of scientists as well as lawyers. For the present, at least, we must
manage with the institutions we have. Conceivably, before the
Term is over we will have some hint from the Supreme Court in
its Vermont Yankee opinion on how it views these problems.18
How such issues will be handled in the twenty-first century is al-
most as fascinating and perplexing as the problems of the UFO's
themselves.
16. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
17. This difference in attitude first surfaced in the opinions in the Interna.
tional Harvester case, particularly in the concurring opinion of Chief Judge
Bazelon emphasizing the procedural aspects of the decision, 478 F.2d at 650, rather
than the substantive aspects emphasized in Judge Leventhal's opinion for the
court, id. at 622. The difference appears again in the concurring opinions of Chief
Judge Bazelon and Judge Leventhal in the Ethyl Corp. case, 541 F.2d at 66, 68, and
finally in Judge Tamm's concurring opinion in the Vermont Yankee case taking ex-
ception to Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion in so far as it emphasizes procedural
deficiencies, 547 F.2d at 658, and in Chief Judge Bazelon's separate statement in
reply in Vermont Yankee, id. at 655.
18. After these remarks were delivered the Supreme Court in Vermont
Yankee reversed the court of appeals. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The opinion by Jus-
tice Rehnquist for a unanimous Court emphatically rejects Chief Judge Bazelon's
view on the ground that it is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act,
id. at 545-48, and remands for further consideration of the substantive grounds
urged by Judge Tamm for setting aside the administrative decision, id. at 549.
Editors' note: For an elaboration of Professor Nathanson's views on the
Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee, see Nathanson, The Vermont Yan-
kee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 183 (1979).
